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principle, and apprehend there was no .foundation for the remark
of his Lordship. He may have had an idea that the patent would
have been -defective in not specifying some visible structure as
the invention ; but that is very different from patenting a principle. The case has little or no bearing on that subject.
From this discussion and examination of the cases the following
conclusions are legitimately drawn :1. Every discoverer of a new and useful application of any law
3f nature, any quality of matter, or any mathematical principle,
is entitled to a patent for it.
2. It is not necessary to entitle him to a patent, that he should
have been the first to seaich out and make known the law, quality,
or principle which he has thus applied. And his having been the
first to bring it to light adds nothing to his claims.
8. He will be iprotected in. his right by holding as infringements of his patent all mechanical equivalents for the de.vices for
carrying his discove'y into effect, which he has described and
designated in his specification as his invention. And he can have
no other protection, even though the principle he has applied was
first di'covered by him.
4. No one can legally specify as his invention, and take out a
patent for the exclusive use of any such law, quality, or principle when emfployed.for the same purpose as his. No instance
can be found where any such patent has been sustained, and they
have-been repeatedly pronounced invalid by the courts.
S..H.H.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of New York.
HUNTINGTON v. OGD.ENSBURGH AND LAKE CHAMPLAIN
RAILROAD COMPANY.'
Where a person employed for a certain term at a fixed salary payable monthly
iswrongfully discharged before the end of the term, he may sue for each month's
salary as it becomes due; and the first judgment will not be a bar to another
action for salary subsequently coming due.

Tins was aii action brought to recover for constructive services
from the 1st of July to the 1st of September 1866.
1We are indebted for this case to Averill & Kellogg, Esqs., the plaintiff's
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The plaintiff proved a contract for services as station agent for
ten months, from March 1st 1866, at $100 per month, payable
monthly; that on the 7th day of June he was discharged without
cause; that he had at all times held himself ready to serve
under said contract, and frequently tendered his services in
pursuance thereof, and that during the time lie had no other
employment.
The defendant proved that on the 21st day of July 1866 the
plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant in a justices'
court, to recover services under said contract for the month of
June; that on the trial the plaintiff proved the contract, his discharge, *readiness and offer to serve during said month, and
defendant's refusal to employ him, and recovered a judgment for
said month's wages.
'At the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a nonsuit,
on the ground that said judgment in the justices court was a bar
to this action. -By direction of the court, a verdict was entered
for the plaintiff for $150, and the case reserved for further consideration.
Averill . Kellogg, for plaintiff.
Brown & Hasbroulc, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The single question is, was the judgment rendered
before the justice for the wages of the month of June under the
contract, a bar to a further recovery for services tendered but not
accepted. "It is settled law that only one action can be maintained for the breach of an entire contract, "and that a- judgment
obtained by the plaintiff in one suit may be pleaded in bar of any
second proceeding; but the diffchlty is, to determine in what
cases the contract is entire, and the question becomes much eomplicated in the consideration of agreements to do specific acts at
various prospective. periods."
Originally, debt was the only action to fecover a sum certain;
and it was held no adtion would lie to recover instalments o7 a
bond, in debt, until all the instalments were due. But when the'
action of assumysit was adopted, the rule was modified, hnd the
plaintiff was allowed to proceed on the first default, although a
judgment in such action was still held a-full satisfaction, But
JAMES,
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thi3 rule was further modified by a de'cision in the King's Bench
in Cook v. Tharwood, 2 Saund..837, in which it was held" that when in an action on an award to pay several sums at
several times, an action might be brought for each sum when due,
that the plaintiff should recover damages accordingly, and have
a new action as the other sums became due."
In Massachusetts (Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick. 437), it was
held that a contract to do several things at several times, is dii:isible in its nature, and that an action of assumpsit would lie for
*everydefault. A note at 224 marginal paging, 3d ed., of Sedgwick on Damages, purporting to be from the case of .Powler v.
A~mour, 24 Alabama 194, says :-" If one contract to serve
another for one year at a stipulated sum, payable monthly, and is
discharged without any fault on his part, before the expiration
of the year, he may treat the contract as still subsisting, and sue
in assumpsit for wages due according to its terms; or he may
consider it rescinded, and'sue for unliquidated damages for its
breach. If he sue on the contract he can only recover the wages
due by its terms before the institution of the suit; if he sue for
damages for breach of contract, he is entitled to recover the
actual damages sustained up to the trial."
In TtoTpson v. Wood, 1 Hilton 93, the.plaintiff claimed to
recover two months' salary on a hiring by the year, he haying
been discharged without cause, and being ready and willing to
perform; the defendant set up a previous action by plaintiff
against defendant; to recover a balance.due for services actually
rendered, and breach of contract; the lattel.claim was withdrawn
on the trial, and judgmeuit rendered only for the balance due at
the time of plaintiff's discharge; and it was held that such judgment was no bar. INGRAHAM, Judge, said: " When an agreement of this kind is broken, the person employed .has his election,
either to sue for his wages as they become due from time to time,
or to bring one action for damages for the breach of the con'tract.
If such action is brought before the term of hiring has expired,
and the party recover damages for a breach of contract, such
recovery estops him from bringing another action; but if his
action is merely to recover the wages due at the time of bringing
the action, he is not thereby deprived of his right either to recover
wages iubsequently becoining payable, or an action for damages
for the subsequent breach of the agreement in not emuloying
VOL. XVI.-1O
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plaintiff according to the contract." According to the dictum
of this case, the former recovery by the, plaintiff here, is no bar
to the present action ; but the point was not necessary to a disposition of the case, the former recovery having been for services
actually rendered before breach.
The defendant cited and relied upon Colburn v. Woodworth,
31 Barb. 381. The facts there were much like those here, except
in the first action the plaintiff in his coniplaint, in addition to a
quarter's wages, claimed damages for a breach of the contract
and issue was joined thereon, and a trial had on such pleadings;
but the recovery was only for the quarter's wages, no other
quarter being due when said action was commenced. Th6 second
action was for the second quarter's wages, and the court held the
first action a bar, on the ground that in that action the plaintiff
had counted for a breach, and that no other action could be maitained on the contract after that.
The real question raised in the present case, is, whether the
m.onthly payments, by the terms of the contract, were several aunI
distinct causes of action, arising as they became due, or whether
they were single and entire.
• In ecor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y. 548, Justice STRONG lays dowrn
this rule: "The true distinctions between demands or rights of
action which are single and entire, and those which are several
and distinct, is, that the former immediately arise out of one- And
the same act or contract, and the latter out of different acts or
contracts. Each contract, express or implied, affords one and
only one cause of action. A contract containing several stipulations to be'performed at different times is no exception, although
an action may be' maintained upon each stipulation as it is brokefi,
before the time for the performance of the other§, the ground of
action being the stipulation, which is in the nature of a several
contract."
What then was the contract in this case ? "It
was a hiring at
100 per month. It was therefore a contract containing several
stipulations-each stipulation giving a right of action on its
breach. There is no doubt the plaintiff could have maintiined a
separate action for each instalment as it became.due,'had he not
been discharged, but continued to serve. Having been discharged
without cause, his rights were not lessened ; he was not bound to
treat the contract as at an end. He eoild have done so, and
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brought his action for damages for the breach; or he could have
waited for the expiration of the whole time, and brought his
action for all the monthly instalments-but he was not bound to
do either. He had the right to treat the contract as still subsist.
ing, and could maintain an actionfor each instalment as it fell
due. I therefore hold, that the action before the justice was no
bar to this, and direct judgment for plaintiff on the verdict.
It is well settled law that an entire
contract will support but one action, and
a judgment for part only of what the
plaintiff might have recovered will. be a
bar to a second action- for the residue.
But where the agreement embraces a
number of distinct subjects which admit
of beingseparately executed and closed, it
must be taken distributively, each subject
being considered as formningthe matter of
a separate agreement after it is so closed :
WAsr ror, J.,.in Perkinsv. Hart, I1
Wheaton 251 ; and each default in such.
case will support an action of assumpsit;
for although the agreement is one, the
performance is several: Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick. -409 ; Lord v. Belknap, I
Cash. 279. Thus assumpsit lies for interest due on a promissory note by which
interest is payable annually, although
the note is not yet due: Greinleaf v.
Kellogg, 2 Mass. 568;' Cooley v. Bose, S
Id. 221. And in a recent case in Massachusetts it was held that judgmefit for the
interest on Such a note was not a bar to
a subsequent action for the principal,
although it was due when the former
action was commenced: Andover Savings' Bank v. Adams, I Allen 28. And
in the same state, where the doctrine of
the divisibility of contracts has been
rather liberally applied, it was held that
an acceptance of an order to pay $200
out of the first money of the drawer received by the drawee out of certain
claims, binds the acceptor to pay on request from time to time as the money is
received, and a judgment recovered
against him for part of the sum on his

refusal to pay, is not a bar to another
action for a further sum subsequently received by him: Perry v. .Barrington, 2.
Metc. 368.
So where a contractor for grading a
railroad contracted for monthly estimates
by defendants' agent of the.quantity and
value of the work done during the
month, four-fifths of which'value were
to be paid immediately. This was considered as a distinct stipulation for each
month's work, and as forming the matter
of a separate agreement: Rodemer v.
Hazlehurst, 9 Gill 289.
And in an action of covenant for instalments of money, a former recovery
on the same instrument was held not to
be a bar where breaches for the instalments now demanded were not specifically assigned in the former suit, and
evidence was considered admissible to
show that the instalments now sued for
had not falfen due and were not included
in the former recovery: Sternerv. Gower,
3 W. & S.. 136. See also Logan v.
Caffrey, 6 Casey 200.
And, generally, it may be said that
where there is part. perfcrmance and by
the terms of the contract payment may
be demanded for that part, an action lies
immediately: Bickets v; Parttson, 14
Wendell 257.
The decision in the principal case,
therefore, that where a person is employed for a definite term at a certain
salary for the term payable at shorter
periods, the portions due at each period
may be atonce sued for, seems to be well
founded in principle and supported bv
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authority. Where, as in the principal
case, the employee has been wrongfully
discharged during the period for which
he was hired, the action is brought on
the principle of constructive service, a
doctrine somewhat peculiar to actions by
ssrvants and employees: 2 Smith's
Lead. Cases 39. Thus, where a school
teacher was employed at a salary. 6f
$1200, payable in two payments of $600
each, at the end of each session of fve
months, and was discharged in three
months, a judgment at the end of the
first session was held not to bar a second
suit for the other payment at the end of
the second session: Armfield v, Nash, 31
Miss. 361. See also Thompson v. Wood,
I Hilton 93; Colburn v. Woodworth, 31
Barbour 381 ; Fosoer v. Armour, 24
Ala. 199.;.- Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wise.
355; Booge v. Pacific Railroad C6., 33
•Mo. 212.
The doctrine of constructive service,
however, does not permit an employee
who has been wrongfully discharged to
remain wilfully idle during the period
for which he had been engaged.. A
party injured by a breach of contract is
entitled only to such damages as will indemnify him for his actual loss, and if
he has it in his power to take measures
by which his loss will be less tiggravated,
this will be expected of him. See Miller v. Mariners' Church, 7 Greenleaf 55,
an early and leading case, in which the
Supreme Court of Maine laid down this
rule with great force. In the case of a
servant oi other employee, discharged,
it is said that " idleness is in itself a
h ret,'hot moral obligation. But if he
continues idle for the purpose of charging another, he superadds a fraud which
the law had rather punish than countenance." CowaN, J., in Shannon v.
Comstock, 21 Wendell 462. And see

also Heckscher v. McCrea, 24 Id. 304 Wilson v. Martin, I Denio 605 ; 2ylor
v. Read, 4 Paige 572; Costigan v. Mo.
hawk, 6-c., Railroad Co., 2 Denio C16;
Heimv. Wolf, I E. D. Smith 70; Bradley v. Denton, 3 Wise. 557.
As a result it may be said that where
an employee for a fixed period at a
salary for the period, payable at intervals, is wrongfully discharged, lie may
pursue any one of four courses :1. He may sue at once for breach of
contract, in which case he can only recover his damages up to the time of
bringing suit, and judgment will be a
bar to any further action.: Colburn v.
Woodworth, 31 .Barb. 381 ; Booge. v.
Pacific Railroad Co., 33 Mo. 212.
2. He may wait till the end of the.
contract period and then sue for the
breach. Primn4faciehe will be entitled
to his full wages or salary for the whole
period, but defendant, to reduce damages,
may show what he has earned or might
reasonably have earned from his discharge to the end of the contract period:
Thompson v. Wood, I Hilton 93 ; Taylor
v. Read, 4 Paige 572; Costigan v. Mohawk, 6ic, Railroad Co., 2 Denio 616;
Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355.
. 3. He may, as in the principal case,
treat the contract as existing and sue at
each period of payment for' the salary
then due, subject, as in the preceding
case, to % reduction by the amount of
what he has earned ormight have earned
in the mean time by pther employment.
4.' He may treat the contract as rescinded and sue immediately on a quan
turn meruit for the services performed.
But in this ease he can recover only for
the time he actually scived: 2 Smith's
Lead. Cases 39 ; Nose to Cttter. v'
. J. T. M
Powell.

GRAY v. CLINTON BRIDGE.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the District qj
Iowa. October Term 1867.
Present, Judges

MILLIER

and LovE.

R. C. GRAY v. THE CLINTON BRIDGE AND OTHERS.
I. The Act of Congress of February 27th 1867 (16 U. S. Stat. 412), declaring
a bridge erected by a railroad compahy across the Mississippi river at the city of
Clinton in the state of Iowa " a lawful structure and a post-route," is constitutional and valid; and under it the Circuit Court of the United States will dismiss
a bill to procure the abatement of the bridge as a nuisance, based on the ground
that it presents a seri6us obstruction to the navigation of the river, although tle
suit for this purpose was pending at the time the Act of Congress was passed.
II. It was objected'to this act
1. That it violates certain treaty obligations of the United States;
2. That Congress has no power over bridges across the navigable streams of the
United States;
3. That the Act was special legislation and invadedthe province of the courts.
These objections severally considered and held not tenable.
I. The poweir of Congress to regulate commerce extends to commerce on
land, cirried on by railroads which are parts of lines of inter-state communication
as well as to commerce carried on by vesgels : and such railroads may be regu.
lated by Congress as well as steamboats: Per MILLER, J.
IV. The compnercial clause of the Constitution expounded by MiLLER, J., i:
reference to railways and boats as instruments of commerce.

Grant and *T. D. lincoln, for complainants.
Howe, for defendants.
Tfie opinion of the court was delivefed by
MILLER, J.-This is a bill in chancery,.the purpose of which
is to procure the abatement of the bridge as a nuisance, on the
ground that it presents a serious obstruction to the navigation of
the Mississippi river. The pleadings are at issue, the depositions
all taken, and the case set down for hearing.
The defendants now present a motion to dismiss the bill for
want of jurisdiction. This motion is founded on the Act of Congress of February 27th 1867 (16 U. S. Statutes 412), which, it is
claimed, takes away the jurisdiction of the court to proceed fur%herin this case.
The complainant, on the other hand, maintains that in the true
,onstruction of the act it was not intended that it should dispose
if the present suit; and that, if such is its true construction,
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then it is unconstitutional. It is said that because the third sec.
tion provides for litigation about the bridge after the passage of
the act, and declares the circuit courts of the United States
should have jurisdiction in such cases, it could not have been the
intention of Congress to conclude the question raised by the bill
in the present suit. But the second section of the act makes certain regulations concerning the use of the draw in the3 bridge,
and contemplates that suits may grow out of a neglect or violation
of those rules. It is to this litigation that the third section seems
most naturally to refer. At all events, it is to litigation arising
after the passage of the.act to which alone that section by its
own terms can apply.
The first section of that act, after describing a.bridge already
erected across the Mississippi river at Clinton, declares thht "1it
shall be a lawful structure, and shall be recognised and known
as a post route.'! It cannot be doubted that Congress was aware
of the existence of the bridge, and that it fiad been complained
of as an unauthorized and illegal obstruction to navigation. Nor
can I see any reason to .doubt that by this act Congress intended
to remove the objection of its illegality and want of authorization
so far as it had power to do so.
The declaration that it shall be a la'wful structure admits of no
other interpretation. The language is almost the same as that
used by the same body in reference to the Wheeling bridge,
where such was held to be its intent by the Supreme Court:
State of Pennsylvaniav. W'heeling Bridge, 18 Hor. 421.
It is not necessary to determine whether Congress had an
intentional reference to this suit, which was pending when the act
was passed, or whether it was aware that there was such a suit. If it had the power to make the bridge lawful, which before
was unlawful, it has done so in this case, and the court must be
governed by the law as it exists when it is called upon to act.
The objections here taken to the constitutionality of that act
are these:
1. That it is in violation of certain treaties between the United
States and foreign nations, which declare in effect that the nav'
gation of the Mississippi river shall remain free and unobstructed
for ever.
2. That no power exists in Congress to authorize or regulate
bridges over the navigable streams of the United Stites.
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8. That such special legislation, while' a suit is pending in the
courts about the same matter, is an invasion of the rights of the
judicial department of the government as secured by the Constitution.
1. In reference to the first of these objections, we need not
inquire whether those treaties were designed to affect such cases
as the one before us or not; for we are of opinion that whatever
obligation they may have imposed upon our government, the
courts possess no power to declare a statute passed by Congress
and approved by the President, to be void because it may violate
such obligations.
Those are international questions, to be settled between the
foreign nations interested in the treaties and the political depart.
ments of. our government. When those departments declare a
treaty abrogated, annulled, or modified, it is not for the judicial
branch of the government to set it up and assert its continual
obligation. If the court could do this, it'could annul declarations of war, suspend the levy of armies, and become a great
international arbiter, instead of a court of justice for the administration of the laws of the United States.
2. The second of these objections involves the consideration of
the commercial clause, as it is appropriately, called, of the Constitution.
' If the deteiaination of the circumstances under which a bridge
may be built over a navigable stream, or the prescribing general
rules on that subject, is a regulation of commerce, either with
foreign nations or among the states, then it.falls within the powers conferred on Congress by that clause.
It would be sufficient in this court to say fhat we are concluded
on this question by the decision of the Supreme Court in that
branch of the Wheeling- Bridge Case, already referred to, in 18
Howard, which expressly holds that the power to declare such a
bridge a lawful structure is included within the clause df the
Constitution above cited. That case was, however, decided by a
court nearly equally divided, and its authority has been much
questioned.
I think,. however, that the proposition is well founded in prin.
ciple. The power to regulate commerce is one of the most useful
of all those confided to federal government, and, its exercise has
done as much to create and to foster that community of interest
which constitutes the strongest bond of nationality, as the -
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exercise of any other power belonging to the General Govern.
ment. The want of this power was one of the strongest necessities which led to the formation of the Constitution. The clause
has always received at the hands of the courts and of Congress
a construction tending liberally to promote its beneficent object.
The power to regulate commerce is a power to regulate the
instruments of commerce. In the case of Cooley v. The B'oard
of Wardens, 12 How. 316, the court says that "the power to
regulate naviga'tion is the power to prescribe rules in conformity
with which navigation must be carried on. It extends to the
persons who conduct it, as well as to the instruments used."
Navigation is here spoken of as one of the subjects of legislation
included within the power to regulate commerce. In this view
of the subject, Congress has passed statutes regulating st6amboats,
their construction, equipment, officers and crews, prescribing
qualificationd of.pilots and engineers, limiting the number of passengers-they may carry, and laying down the signals they shall
use in passing each other, and, in short, has prescribed a minute
code for building and navigating those vessels. The right to do
this depends wholly upon the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce, and has never been disputed.
Navigation, however, is only one of the elements of commerce
It is an element of commerce, because it affords the means of
transporting passengers and merchandise, the interchange, of
which is commerce itself. Any other mode of effecting this
would be as much an element of commerce as navigation. When
this transportation or interchange of commodities is carried .n
by land, it .is commerce as well'as when carried op by water;
and the power of. Congress to regulate it, is as ample 'in the one
case as in the other. The " commerce among the states" spoken
of in the Constitution must, at the time that instrument was
adopted, have been mainly of this character, for the steamboat,
which has created our great internal commerce on the rivers, was
then unknown.
Another means of.transportation, equal in importance to the
steamboat, has also come into existence since the Constitution wa'
adopted, a means by 'which merchandise is transported. across
states and kingdoms in the same vehicle in which it started. The
railroad now shares with the steamboat the monopoly of the carrying trade. The one has with great benefit been subjected to
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the control of salutary congressional legislation, because it .is an
instrument of commerce. Is there any reason why the other
should not? However this question may be answered in'regard
to that commerce which is conducted wholly within the limits of
a state, and is therefore neither foreign commerce, nor commerce
among the states, it seems to me that when these roads become
partg of great highways of our Union, transporting a commerce
which embraces many states, and destined, as some of these roads
are, to become the channels through which the nations of Europe
Dnd Asia shall interchange their commodities, there can be no
reason to doubt that to -regulate them is to regulate commerce,
both with foreign- nations and among the states ; and that to
refuse to do this, is a refusal to discharge one of themost important duties of the Federal Government. As already intimated, the
shackles with which the different states fettered commerce in their
selfish efforts to benefit themselves at the expense of their confederates, was one of the nain causes which led to the formation
of our present Constitution. The wonderful growth of that commerce since it has been placed exclusively under the control of
the Federal Government, has .justified the wisdom of our fthers.
But are we to remit the most valuable part of that commerce
again to the control of the states, and to all.the consequent vexations and burdens which the states may impose. through whose
territories it ibust be carried on ? And must all this be permitted.
because the carrying is done by a method not thought of when
the Constitution was framed?
For myself, I must say that I have no doubt of the right of
Congress to.prescribe all needful and proper regulations for the
conduct of this immense traffic over any railroad which has
voluntarily become part of one of those lines of inter-s*tate communication, or to authorize the creation of such roads, when the
purposes of . ter-state traLsportation of persons and property justify or require it.
The bridge which we are now considering constitutes a part of
an uninterrupted iron track from the Atlantic sea-board to the
Missouri river, over which many thousand persons and millions
of dollars worth of merchandise are carried every year. Within
two or three years, it is confidently believed, this track will be
without break from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and will
carry the commerce of continents. Cah it be seriously doubted

GRAY v. CLINTON BRIDGE.

that in reference to this commerce, the magnitude of which we
can hardly conceive, Congress can prescribe the place where the
bridge shall be built over which it crosses the Mississippi river,
and shall make such regulations concerning its character and its
use as shall be best for the commerce of the river as well as the
road ? The commerce of the river and the commerce across the
rivbr, are both commerce among the states, and may be regulated
by Congress, and should be regulated by that body when any
regulation is necessary.
3. Whatever might be my individual opinion as a member of
the Supreme Court, in the proposition that the statute under consideration is an invasion of the judicial powers of this court, I am,
while sitting here, bound by the decision in the Wheeling Bridge
Case, already referred to, where this question was -raised and.
decided.
The Act of February 27th 1867, then, in our opinion, must
finally, dispose of this case. But it does so by furnishing a rule
of law on which it must be decided, and not by depriving the court
of jurisdiction. When reached for hearing, the bill must be dismissed on the merits, and not for want of jurisdiction. The present motion, for this and other reasons, cannot prevail.
But we have given the views of the court on the effect of the
statute in the case,, because counsel have argued it fully, and
because the case being set down for hearing, counsel may possibly
arrange that a decree should be entered in conformity with 'this
opinion, without further hearing.
A decree was accordingly entered dismissing the -bill, but at
the cost of the defendants.
In the principles involved the foregoing case is one of great magnitude. The
exposition of the commercial clause of
the Constitution is one which cannot
fail to attract very general professional,
legislative, and public attention.
Until quite recently it seems very
reneially to have been taken for granted
that private railways, though carrying
on an immense traffic between different
states, and though constructed to form
between different- portions of the Union
unbroken lines of communication, were

exempt from congressional regulation or
eontrol.
The necessity for some common, central legislative power has been most
seriously felt. Many of the evils to be
remedied growing out of the rivalries
and the selfishness, of these corporations,
have proved to be beyond any effective
state control.
We rejoice to hear so careful and
able a jurist as Mr.'Justice MILLER, of
the Supreme Court of the United States,
declare tat he "has no doubt of the
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right of Congress to prescribe all needful and proper regulations for the conduct of the traffic carried on over any
railroad which voluntarily becomes part
of a line of inter-state communication;
or to authorize the creation of such
roads when' the purposes of inter-state
nansportation of persons and property
justify or require it."
As illustrative of thd necessity of
nanonal or congressional supervision
over railways we quote from an interesting and valuable article on the subject
of "1Legislative control ovir railway
chaiters," published in the April No.
1867, of the American Law Review.
* The authors say . "In the state of
Massachusetts it is maintained that great
difficulty has arisen from the manageInent of the roads connecting the city of
Boston with Albany and the West. The
discussion has brought to light many
facts tending conclusively to show that
these roads have for years been managed
with little regard to the growing needs
of the community. The charges so substantiated involve some of the most
serious that -can Well be brought against
a railroad cbrporation, without amounting to misuser. They can be grouped
under three great heads ; namely,
1. Quarrels among corporations,
causing great public detriment.
2. Unnecessarily excessive rates of
fare and freight.
3. Insufficient accommodation for the
public requirements."
Under the last head it even appears
that the great channel of intercourse
between the second commercial city of
the Union and the West, after thirty
years of successful operation, has neither
a doable track or a grain elevator: Id.
pp. 473, 474.
And in connection with this subject
we call particular attention to an article
published in a recent number of this
Journal (Am. Law Reg. February 1867),
upon state and national legislation, so
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far as that article relates to railways.
The distinguished author of that article,
Judge REDFIELD, has for years made
railways a subject of special study. His
opinion upon any bran(h of the law is
entitled to great weight ; but his opinions
upon questions, whether general or legal,
connected with railways have a particular
value.
He says: "There is confessedly a
necessity for some legislative and judicial control of the railways in the country, which shall bring them all to the
same point,. that of promptness, uniformity of charges, and safety. * *
These have become a necessity to the
public interest. By'promptness we do
not mean rapidity of movement, but
regularity and system, so that the public
can know what to expect and what to
-depend upoi. This can only be effected
by some very stringent system of supervision, by which all the rolling-stock
can be kept in the most perfect condition,
as well as the road-bed and track, and
that the rolling-stock shall b6 kept fully
up to the business demands of the line.
And this supervision can only be effected
by stringent laws, stringently enforced.
And to be of any practical avail, it must
extend throughout the whole country.
Railways must be rbgaided as indis*
pensable publiq interests, before they can
be put under such management and
supervision as to secure the public accommodationL, as a leading'and primary
motive to action."
The article then goes on to show that
such supervision ii as beneficial to the
shareholder as to the public.
It then adds: "The same thing is
true as regards uniformiy of-charges for
freight and passengers. 'It is undetiable that this is one of the things impossible to be effected [by state legislation]
upon our American railways which extend through different states, in all of
which the laws are different, and in none
of which has this matter of uniformity
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of charges been sufficiently regarded. source of authority for congressional
It is the one thing which alone will ena- interference.
Certainly as respects such lines, why
ble the railways and the people both to
live, and conduct business upon fair may not Congress provide by law for
grownds. And the want of some such the safety of passengers on cars as they
stringent system of supervision, which have done for the safety of passengers
should bring all charges to a uniform on water, by providing for the inspection
standard and a reasonable limit, is the of machinery, &c., &c. ?
For many reasons any effcetive legis, cry thing which has ruined many of the
most productive lines of railway in the lation respecting uniformity of chaiges
country." It might be added that it is must come from Congress.
First, it is a question whether, unless
also the very thing which is now almost
crushing out the life of large sections the right to do so is reserved in the
of territory in the different states which charter, a state may interpose in this matdepend for railway facilities upon cor- ter. Such interposition will be claimed
porations owned and managed in other to impair "the obligation of contracts,"
which a state may not do.
states.
As to the course of legislation and'ju"The matter of safety too," says
Judge REDFIELD, "in the passenger dicial decision in the several states on
traffic upon railways is one of almost the subject of corporate grants and refrightful' importance, and at the same servations as respects railway charters,
time one where there is absolutely no the article in the Am. Law Review
cofrective except in the way of penalties (April 1867), above referred to, may be
and pecuniary mulcts, by wa, of dam- profitably consulted.- .
But if this power* exists in a given
ages for injuries inflicted through defective apparatus and want of due care.' state it cannot control roads outside of
There should be some power able to its boundaries, and, therefore, in many
insure to the public the perfect condi- cases a state is without the power to
tion both of the track and the rolling- remedy the evil of.either exorbitant or
stock,' at all times. * * * It will be discriminating tariffs.
Whether Congress can advantageously
impossible to establish any supervision
which will be effective except through the legislate on the subject of tariffs or
charges is a matter which does not fall
agency of the general government."
He then discusses and affirms the within our purpose to discuss 'more at
right of the "national government to length at this time. But that it could
control the- railways of the country." and should legislate upon the subject so
He holds that the national government as to better insure the safety of the lives
may "construct entire lines of railway and limbs of the travelling public by a
thorough system of inspection of roadat the puolic expense," or "delegate
the same powers and functions to indi- beds, cars, machinery, and by providing
rules for tbe management of trains, &c.,
viduals."
But he uues not allude to the commer- will be admitted on all hands. And the
cial clause of*the Constitution referred main object of this note is to call attento by Mr. Justice M!LLER, which at tion to the question of the power of Conlenst, so far as regards lines of railways gress, under the Constitution,. over the
running to and connecting different railways of the country.
J. F. D.
istate, seems to be a clear and ample
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United States District Court, Eastern Districtof Pennsylvania.
In Bankruptcy.
IN RE DAVID RUTH, BANKRUPT.
Under the present bankrupt law of the United States and the state exemption
taws incorporated with it, the exemption of such property, real or personal, of the
appraised value of $300, .as a bankrupt in Penosylvania may elect to retain as
exempt under the laws of the state, is not included in but is additional to the
exception from the operation of the bankrupt law, of such necessary and suitable
articles, not exceeding in value $500, as with due reference, in thei amount, to
the bankrupt's family, condition, and circumstances, may be designated and set
apart by the assignee, subject to the court's revision.
But this exception to the full value of $500, ought not to be allowed in all
cases, without discrimination or measure.

TnE 14th section of the Bankrupt Law of 2d March 1867, 14
U. S. Laws 522, excepts from the operation of the assignment
of a bankrupt's estate his necessary household and kitchen furniture, and such of his other articles and necessaries, not exceeding
in value, in any case, $500, as shall be designated and set apart
by the assignee, having reference, in the amount, to the bankrupt's family, condition and" circumstances ; also, his -wearing
apparel, and that of his wife and children, and his uniform, arms
and equipments, if he is or has been a soldier in the militia, or in
the service of. the United States, and such other property as is
and ihall be exempt from, attachment or execution by the laws of"
the United States, and such other property, not included in t he
foregoing exceptions, as is exempted by the laws of the state in
'vhich he is domiciled, to an amount not exceeding that allowed
by such state exemption laws in force in the year 1864. And it
is enacted that the determination of the assignee in the matter
shall, on exception taken, be subject to the final decision of the
court.
The Act of Congress of the 19th May 1828, §38, 4, U. S. Laws
281, had provided that the proceedings upon executions .in the
courts of the Unied States should be the same as were then used
in the courts of each state; and had empowered the courts of- the
United States, by rules of practice, to make such proceedings
conformable to any changes thereafter adopted by the legislation
of the respective states. Through this act, and subsequent rules
of practice adopted as authorized by it, the practice in the Federal
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and state courts in 1864 was, in general, the same as to the exemp
tion of the property of the debtors. .The laws of some of the
states exempted personal property to an amount exceeding in
value $500; and the laws of several states exempted real property
to various greater amounts, extending, in certain states, even to the
-value of $5000, if not beyond it. By the laws of other states the
exemption was .limited 'to subjects of the value, in the whole, of
less than $500. The laws of Pennsylvaiiia exempted all wearing
Apparel of the debtor and his family, and all bibles and school
books in use in the family, and, as to the debts contracted since
4th of July 1849, exempted such other property, real or personal,
as he might elect to retain, to the value of $300, to be ascertained,
upon his request, by the valuation of sworn-appraisers summoned
by the officers levying the execution. - The debtor was allowed
to elect to retain this, amount, out of any bank-notes, money,
stocks, judgments or other indebtedness to him.
Accbding to one of the forms which the judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States have prescribed, under the authority
-conferred upon them by the 10th section of the bankrupt law, a
debtor petitioning for adjudication and relief in bankruptcy must
set forth, under a distinct head'of one of the schedules annexed
to his petition, a particular statement of the property claimed as
excepted by the provisions of the 14th section of the act from the
operation of his future assignment; giving each item and- its
valuation, and if, any portion is real estate, giving its location,
description, and present use. The statement is to be thus made
in two -divisions, one of them containing the property claime.d'to
be excepted, which uay be set apart by the assignee -under. the
14th section of tlie act, and the other containing the property
claimed to be exempt by state law.s. One of the general orders
3f the Supreme Court (Gen. Order -XIX.)requires the assignee,
immediately on entering upon-his duties, to prepare a complete
inventory of all -the property that comes into his possession, and
to make report to the court, within twenty days after receiving
the deed of assignment, of the articles set off to the bankrnipt. by
him, according to the provisions of the 14th section of the act,
witik- the estimated value of each article, and allow to creditors
twenty days from the filing of such report for taking exceptions
to the determination of the assignee. There is a form appended
(No. 20) of the qehedul, f property thus designated and *et
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apart by the assignees to be retained by the bankrupt, requiring
specification of it under five heads, viz., necessary household and
kitchen furniture, other articles and necessaries, wearing apparel.
of bankrupt and his family, equipments, if any, as a soldier, other
property exempted by the laws of the United States, property
exempted by state laws.
In this case the bankrupt.had exhibited in the proper schedule
annexed to his petition, and under the proper head, a statement,
in the two divisions prescribed, of personal property to the value
of $500, claimed by him as excepted,.which might be set apart
by the assignee, and other personal property to the value of
$291 75, claimed -as exempt by the laws of the state. The
assignee set apart, for the bankrupt's use, personal property of
the appraised value of $500, and no more, composed of.items
included in each of the two divisions of the bankrupt's claim of
exception and exemption annexed, as above, to his petition. According to the assignee's 'inventory and the estimate of the
appraisers, the.whole value of the remaining personal estate was
$259.56. The real estate was appraised at $2000.
"The bankrupt demands of the assignee that the additional
$300 worth of property exempted by the laws of Pennsylvania
shall be set apart to him." This the Register certifies, adding
that "the opinion of the court is required for the guidance of the
assigpee." The bankrupt demands, in effect, an exemption to the
value, in the whole, of .$800.
It was objected that an exemption to this amount shoild not be
allowed in any case. In support of the objection it was said, in
this case and in another somewhat similar, that the legislation of
the United States having assumed $500 in value, and the legislation of the state having assumed $300 in value, to be the greatest
proper amount of exemption, a result of the two legislations combined, would extend the exemption to $800, cannot have been
intended, because it would be absurd. • It was therefore argued
that the exemption of $500 under the Act of Congress, must be
understood as including, that of $300 under the laws of the state,.
except as to bibles and school books, which alone were within the
proper meaning of the phrase "other, property," in the Act of
Congress. Although a debtor might, under the law of the state,
elect that real property of the appraised value of $300 should be
exempt, yet when he did so, he made it, according to this argu-
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ment, a part of the $500 in value exempted. At all events, it
was contended that the twofold or cumulative exemption could
only be allowed in a case in which the 'subjects of the two divisions were so different that those of the one kind could not be
included in those of the other, and consequently that it should not
be allowed in the present case where the .whole exemption was
under both divisions, claimed from personal estate of the same
general character.
It was answered that the assumed intention to limit the exemption to $500 in value was not rightly attributable to Congress,
and that the contrary became apparent on recurrence to the abovementioned exemption laws of some other states which the Act of
Congress had in effect incorporated with its provisions, these laws
admitting exemptions to amounts vastly greater than $500; and
that even if this had been otherwise, the exemption of $300 under
the Pennsylvhnis laws could not be included in that of $500 under
the Act of Congress, because the subjects were different. The
difference *asserted was that the subjects of exemption under the
stite laws were, except as to their valuation, determined absolutely by t6m debtor's own arbitrary election, whereas, under the
Act of Congress, the subjects of exemption were determinable by
a designation which the assignee was to make, upon relative considerations of suitableness, depending upon the debtor's family
and condition in life, and his former circumstances, and that this
determination was afterwards judicially revisable. It was contended that the subjects were therefore different, and according
to the relative sense of the "other property" in the Act of Congress, were. independent of, and consequently additional 'to one
another. According to this argument, besides wearing apparel,
bibles, school-books, uniforms, arms'and equipment, and property to
the appraised value of $300, arbitrarily designated. by the bankrupt
himself, the assignee is, with due reference to the bankrupt's family,
condition, and circimstances, to'designate such additional property
as may not, in these respects be unsuitable, which cannot exceed,
but may reach $500 in value, and thus the whole may amount, in
a proper case, to $800, in addition to the wearing appar.el ant.
other specifically designated articles.
As to the special considerations which ought, unlder the Act of
Congress, to determine the designation by. the assignee, or to de-
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termine its extension to such a maximum, nothing was said on
either side.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CADWALADER, J.-If the exemptio laws of all the states had
resembled those of Pennsylvania, there would have been great
apparent force in the argument against allowing the twofold exemption under the state laws and the Act of Congress to extend
in any case, in the whole, beyond the value of $500. There would,
however, have been difficulty in accofumodating the argument to
the words of the Act of-Congress. Whether this difficulty could
have been overcomie it is unnecessary to consider, because, upon
recurrence to the exemption laws of other states whicl are, in
effect, incorporated with the Act of Congress, the argument loses
all force or all appli6ability. The Act of Congress must, therefore, be interpreted With reference to other motives of legislation.
Proceedings in bankruptcy, where it is involuntary, resemble
in many respects a general execution for the equal benefit of the
creditors. Where bankruptcy is voluntary, the resemblance does
not in all respects fail. It is foreign to the purpose of proceedings under such a bankruptcy that they should operate upon prois thus exempt
perty otherwise exempt from execution, unless it.
under defdctive previous laws, which the bankrupt law is in-this
respect intended to improve. Under the present bankrupt law no.
such change was intended; On the\contrary, the previous uniform
system under state laws of exemption' in the Federal and state
courts is continued, as it had been established under the Act of
Congress of 1828, and under subsequent rules of the Federal
courts atithorized by this act. In this respect the bankrupt law
merely provides that the state exemption laws, thus previously
adopted, shall still apply, so as to exclude their subjects from the
operation of the proceedings in bankruptcy. The law further
enacts in effect that there may in proper cases be an additional
exemption, to be graduated with reference to the number, health,
&c., of the members of the -bankrupt's family, to his condition in
life, social and otherwise, and to his former and recent, if not
present circumstances. Confusion of the views of the present
question has arisen from hastily assuming that it is a question of
the absolute unmeasured allowance of an additional exemption to
the value of 500. The allowance is conditional, and is measured
VOL. XVI.-I 1
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not merely with reference to value, but also to subjects, and their
suitableness to personal requirements. The' subjects must be
necessaries and other articles, which in character, as well as in
amount and value, are suitable to his family, condition, and circumstances. There may be cases, few perhaps in number, in
which, though he ma own property of a value considerably exceeding .$300, it would sanction a fraud upon his creditors to
allow him any part of the excess beyond it, except the specifically
designated articles. For exanple, in a possible case a debtor who
never had owned property of the value of $300 beyond the amount
of his debts might become a bankrupt for the very purpose of
depriving creditors of recourse to assets in. excess of this value.
Such an attempt should never be successful. In ordinary cases,
the property excepted should not, howerer, be of less value than
$200, in addi tion to the subjects of the state exemption laws to
the value of $300, and the specifically designated articles. In
special cases the property additionally excepted may be of greater
value ; and in some extraordinary cases may be of the full value
of $500, making the whole value, including $300 under the state
laws, amount to $800, in addition to that of the wearing apparel
and other specifically designated articles.
In the Act of Congress the articles newly excepted are mentioned first, and those previously exempted by state laws are mentioned lastly. The more natural order of considering the two
subjects in Pennsylvania, if not elsewhere, is, perhaps, to invert
this arrangement. Thus, the assignee should first consider what
exemption is claimed under laws of the state. As to the subjects
of this claiin of exemption, his only function is to see to their
proper appraisem6nt. in seeing to it he should proceed as conformably to the laws of the state as may be possible. The subjects of exemption and the specifically designated articles having
been set apart, a more responsible duty is afterwards to be performed by him in designating the additional articles excepted
under the Act of Congress.
In the present case'I infer that if the bankrupt is not to obtain
a further exemption than has been allowed, neither he nbr any
other party objects to the selection .of the articles which he has
received. He was mistaken in demanding the additional amount
as of absolute right, independently of cotisiderations relative to
his family, condition, and circumstances. On the other hand, the

IN RE WELLS & SON.

-163

assignee was also mistaken if he supposed the Act of Congfess to
preclude him absolutely, under all circumstances, from allowing
an exemption beyond the value of $500 in the whole. Whether
this bankrupt ought to have received more than has been allowed
I have no certain means of deciding from what is now before me.
This must be determined by the assignee, whose report, if the
bankrupt persists in .his claim, will be made hereafter through the
Register.

J7istrtct Court of the United States, Northern District of New
York. In Bankruptcy.
IN RE WELLS AND SON.'
A general assignment for the benefit of all iis creditors, by an insolvent debtr,
prior to the 1st of June 1867, is'not necessarily fraudulent nor for the purpose of
delaying or hindering creditors, and, therefore, not necessarily an act of bankruptcy.
Section 39 of the Bankrupt Act, in enumerfiting among acts of bankruptcy the
fraudulent stopping of payment of his commercial paper by a banker, merchant
&c., embraces two cases:-I. "Afraudulent stoppage, which is per se an act of bankruptcy, for which proceedings may be immediately commenced; and
2. A stoppage. not fraudulent, but which becomes an act of bankruptcy by con-

tinuing for fourteen days.
THE petition in this case alleges two acts of bankruptcy, viz.:
First, That on or about the 10th of March; .1867, the said Alfred
L. Wells & Son, being pbssessed of a certain estate and property
(to wit, a stock-of dry goods and other articles, together with
divers accounts against persons to whom they had sold goods, &c.),
made at assignment of the whole of them, with. intent to delay
and hinder their creditors; and Second, That on or about the
16th of March, 1867, being merchants and traders, they fraudulently stopped and suspended, and had not resumed payment of
their commercial paper within a period of fourteen days.
The petition also shows that at the time above mentioned the
firm was insolvent; that judgments had been taken agaihst them,
and the suits upon other demands against them had been commenced, and were being prosecuted to judgment and execution.
I We are irilebted for this case to The Gazette.-EDs. Am. LAw REG.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
HALL, Dist. J.-The execution of a general assigilment for the
common and equal benefit of all their creditors is adniitted ; but
it is denied that it was executed with the intent to delay or hinder
creditors. As there is no replication to the answer containing
this lenial, and as the case has been brought to a hearing on the
petition 'and answer, this intent, if it -be not conclusively pre
sumed as a matter of law, must be regarded as disproved; and as
there is no allegation that the assignment referred to was mada
with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act,
we are not now called upon to decide whether a general assign
ment making a -disposition of the bankrupt's property substantially
the same as that contemplated by the Bankrupt Act, can be considered an act of bankruptcy, if made 'in good faith before the
first day of June last, and consequently before any petition could
be filed under the act and for the single purpose of preventing a
portion.of his creditors from obtaining a preference over his other
crbditors.
We thinkthere is no conclusive legal presumption that th,.
-

assignment was made to delay or hinder creditors. ft may, per.
haps, be truly said it was made with- intent to delay and hindev
the particular creditors who-were striving to obtain a preferencb
over the other creditors of the respondents, by pressing the suite
they had already commenced to judgment and execution ; bu" this
intent is not such an intent as the Bankrupt Act contemplates.
-Such an assignment, under such circumstances, and, with such
intent, 'would not be held void -under the statute of this stite,
which avoids conveyances made with the intent to delay, hinder,
or defraud' creditors, and notwithstanding the provision of the
35th section of the Bankrupt Act, that a sale, assignment, transfer, or conveyance not made in the usual course of business of the
debtor, shall be primd faeie evidence of fraud, we are of the opinion
that, under the denials contained in the answer in this case, we
cannot properly hold that the making of the assignment, under
he circumstances stated, -was an act of bankruptcy.
Upon the second allegation of an- act of bankruptcy, the petitioners are entitled to an adjudication in bankrTiptcy against .the
respondents. It is true that the construction of the provision of
the Bankrupt Act on which this allegation is based, is notentirely
free from doubt, but the construction which justifies such. an
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adjudication has been adopted in another district, and is, .as we
think, a reasonable and just construction of such provision. It
was contended upon the argument that this provision, which
authorizes proceedings in invitum against any person "who,
being a banker, merchant, or trader, has fraudulently stopped or
suspended, and not resumed payment of his commercial paper
within a period of fourteen days," does not authorize such proceedings, unless the briginal stoppage or suspension of payment
was fraudulent-no matter how long such suspension may be
"continued.
We understand that the United States District Court of South
Carolina has decided that such is not the true construction of the
provision referred to, and that its true construction requires an
adjudication in bankruptcy against a banker, merchant, or trader
.' who has suspended'and not resumed payment of his commercial
paper within a period of fourteen *days," although such suspension
or stoppage of payment was not 'fraudulent; and this, we think,
is the fair and. proper construction. The provision embraces the
two cases ; the one of an original fraudulent stoppage of payment,
in which proceedings may .e.instituted at once, and the other of
a suspension of payment, not fraudulent and not per se an act of
bankruptcy, but which, if continued for more than fourteen days,
becomes an act of bankruptcy by its continuance.
This constr'tiction of the language of this particular provision
under consideration is, -we think, best calculated to carry out the
general intentions of Congress, as expressed in the Bankrupt Act,.
and such construction, if not strictly reqcuirgd by, is certainly
not inconsistent with the language of the particular provision
alluded to.
It can hardly be supposed that Congress intended that the
creditors of a banker, merchant, or trader, who had fraudulently
stopped payment of his commercial paper, should be compelled to
allow him fourteen days to consummate his fraudulent putposes,
and perhaps secretly remove from the United States with the
mass of his property before they could take proceedings against
him. There is certainly no more reason for allowing such delay
after a fraudulent act of that character than there is in a case
where a bankrupt has fraudulently concealed or transferred a
portion of his property. But when the suspension of payment is
from necessity, and withoutfraud,the period of fourteen days is
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properly allowed the honest trader, that he may, in case he is
solvent, and is only temporarily embarrassed, take the necessary
measures to enable him to pay his dishonored paper, and prevent
his business being broken up by proceedings in bankruptcy. The
accidental loss or miscarriage of expected remittances ; the unexpected failure of a correspondent, or of a bank in which his
deposits are kept; the failure of his debtors to meet their commercial paper, or any other of the many misfortunes and accidents
incident to commercial and financial operations, may compel an
entirely solvent and perfectly safe merchant or trader to suspend
for a day or two the payment of his commercial paper; but a
merchant of fair character, who is solvent and deserving of credit,
-can, by means of temporary loans or otherwise, provide for resuming payment of his commercial paper within the fourteen days
allowed by the Bankrupt Act. A suspension continued for a
longer period may well be considered as evidence of hopeless
insolvency, or of a want of adequate capacity to carry on his
business, and as entitling his creditors to take proceedings to
secure the application of his property to the payment of his debts.
Between those two classes-between the honest trader who sus.
pends payment by reason of 'misfortune or accident, and the
fraudulent one who stops payment that he may retain and secure
his means for the future benefit of himself or family, to the exclusion of his creditors-Congress has, we think, very properly made
-a clear distinction-a distinction which .can only be acted on by
adhering to. the construction heretofore given to the provision
referred to by the only District Coart which has withiti our knowledge passed upon this question.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.•
CURRI v. SCOTT, THE ERIE AND PITTSBURGH RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.
The directors of the Erie and Pittsburgh Railroad Company had power io receive
subscriptions for all the untaken stock, and to issue certificates thefefor ; and the
moment this was done the holder became a stockholder, and, entitled to a stockholder's rights.
The law authorizes ho distinction between the rights of one stockholder and
those of another. If one has not paid his subscription in full he is a debtor for

CURRY v. SCOTT.

167

so much of the subscription as remains unpaid, but is none the less a stockholder.
It is not to be admitted that an old stockholder had a right, to subscribe tc, the
untaken stock, superior to the rights of one who owned no stock.
An Act of Assembly authorizing the issue of preferred stock did not work a
change in the charter until accepted by the stockholders, but when so accepted the
directors are authorized to issue the preferred stock.
The legislature may confer enlarged powers upon the managers of a corpora.
tion, with the assent of shareholders; and no one stockholder, by refusing his
assent, can hinder the exercise of the enlarged powers.

Tuis was a bill in Equity filed at Hb,rrisburg, and certified to
Philadelphia, Where it wds argued and decided.
The bill charges the incorporation of the defendant, company
with a capital stock of twenty thousand shares of $50 each.
That complainant' is a stockholder. That the Act of February
10th 1865, which authorized the board of directors to receive
subscriptions of all-or any part of the unsubscribed stock of said
company, under such regulations, " as to time and manner of such
subscription, as said directors shall prescribe, any law or usage
to the contrary notwithstanding; and the subscribers to said stock
to have the same rights in said company as if they had been
original subscribers thereto," was passed without complainant's
knowledge .and consent.
That he never approved of it, but had always refused to ratify
it.
That at the time of its passage there had been subsqribed or
issued twelve thousand five hundred and forty shares which had
been fully paid for to said company, leaving unsubscribed seven
thousand four hundred and sixty shares.
That the board of directors accepted the Act of February 1865,
and prescribed the manner in which the stock should be subscribed, and then permitted John Van M'Collum to subscribe the
seven thousand four hundred and sixty shares, upon the payment
of $5 on each at the time of subscribing, and issued certificates
of stock therefor.
That on the 21st March 1865, the .legislature passed an act
authorizing the directors of the company to issue a preferred
stock to the amount of $500,000, on which the holder 1 shall be
entitled to receive, at all events, such interest or dividends not
exceeding 8 per cent., as the board of directors shall fix at the
time of issuing said stock-with the right of the holders thereof
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to vote at all elections, and receive a share of all dividends over
the special rate so fixed, equally with the common stock.
That it was the intention of the direct6rs to issue said preferred
stock.
That the officers of the company had been elected by illegal
votes, based on this seven thousand four hundred and sixty shares
of alleged irregular and void stock.
Prayer, That the said two Acts of Assembly be declared null
and void; and that the seven thousand four hundred and sixty
shares of M'Collum be decreed to be given up and cancelled, and
the election of January 8th 1866 be set aside ; and that defendants be enjoined from issuing the preferred stock.
The defendants demurred.
John H. Walker, for demurrer.
Benjamin Grant, contra.
The opifiion of the court was delivered by
J.-The objects sought to be obtained by the bill are
mainly such.as are attainable by a writ of quo warranto; and it
might perhaps be questioned whether they can be secured in a
court of equity.
A portion of the relief sought, however, is such as a court of
law cannot give, and it is not assigned as one of the grounds of
the demurrer that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.
We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the bill exhibits a case
entitling the plaintiff to relief.
It avers; in substance, that the Erie and Pittsbuirgh Railroad
Company, of which the plaintiff is a stockholder, having a portiot
of its authorized capital stock undisposed of, prescribed a time
and manner for subscription of that which previously remained
untaken; that afterwards, and so far as it appears, at the time
and in the manner prescribed, John Van M'Collum, one of the
defendants, subscribed for all the stock that remained untaken,
seven thousand four hundred and sixty shares; that the company
received his subscription'; that he then paid on account of each
share -5 ; that the company issued certificates of stobk -for the
stock thus taken, and that at the annual election next succeedifig
he was permitted to vote said shares. It is not averred tha there
was any fraud in the subscription, or that- the plaintiff or any
'STRONG,
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other person was denied the privilege- of subscribing ; or that the
stock taken by 'M'Collum was worth more than its par value, at
which he took it; but the bill rests upon the assumption that the
directors of the company had no power thus to dispose of tWeir
untaken stock; and that M'Collum could not thus acquire the
rights of a stockholder to vote at an election. The bill also avers
that an Act of Assembly was passed on the 10th day of :February
1865, by which it was enacted that the board of directors of the
Erie and Pittsburgh Railroad Company be authorized to, receive
,subscriptions for all or any part of the unsubscribed stock of said
company, under such rcgulations as to time and manner of such
subscription as said directors should prescribe, any law or usage
to the contrary notwithstanding;' and that the subscribers to said
stock should have the same rights as if they had been original
subscribers thereto.. Provided, that any person subscribing
therefor, should pay at the time of subscribing $5 on each share
subscribed. But the plaintiff insists that this act is of no force
because it is an unwarranted infringement upon the rights of t]hose
who were stockholders at the time of its passage ; and much of
the argument has been expended in assailing and sustaining the
validity of the enactment. We are of opinion, however,, that the
discussion was unnecessary ; for without the act the directors of
the company had power to receive subscriptions for all the untaken
stock, and issue certificates therefor, and the moment this was
don6 the holder became a stockholder, and entitled to the rights
of a stockholder.
The company was incorporated without. any appointment of
commissioners to receive subscriptions for stock; but it was
enacted.that the stock should consist of twenty thousand shares,
of $50 each.
It was not required that any portion of it should be subscribed
or paid in before the organization of the company; but the corporation was endowed at once with all the rights and privileges
conferred by the general Railroad Act and its supplements. Of
course such subscriptions for stock were authorized after the
orgauiiation until the authorized amount had been taken; and
what else do new subscribers become than stockholders having
equal rights with others ?
The law authorizes no distinction between the rights of one
stockholder and those of another. If one has not Daid his sub-
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scription in full, he is a debtor for so much as remains unpaid;
but he is none the less a stockholder.
It is insisted, however, that the directors had no right to allow
M'Collum to subscribe, and thus obtain the untaken stock, because
it belonged to the old stockholders, and it should have been sold
for their benefit, or they should have been allowed to take it irn
proportion to the shares they held.
It would be a sufficient answer to this to say the bill does not
allege that the plaintiff, or any of the old stockholders offered, or
that they are willing to take it at par; nor does it allege that the
stock could have been sold at a higher price than par. It therefore sets forth nothing that is injurious to the complainant. But
when it is said that the untaken stock belongs to the old stocknolders, more is meant than can be admitted. In a certain sense
the assertion is true. But it is not to be admitted that an old
stockholder had a right to subscribe to the untaken stock superior
to the rights of one who owned no stock. If this were so, a first
subscriber- might compel all the remaining untaken stock to be
sold, or at least would have a right to exclude any other person
from subscribing.
The cases upon which the plaintiff relies are inapplicable to the
case now in hand. In Gray v. The Portland,Bank, 3 Mass.
364, it was held that when a banking company had been incorporated with a capital not less than one sum and .not greater than
another, and had commenced business with the smaller capital,
and afterwards voted to increase it to the larger, those who held
the stock in the capital first raised had a prior right to subscribe
to the new stock.
The case was really decided by two judges of a court consisting of five; but assuming it to be sound law, it is unlike the case
we have. Here is no increase of capital, but a.filling up of one
both authorized and required. This is a. substantial difference.
So the case of _eese v. The' Bank of Montgomery County, 7
Casey 78, decides nothing more than that untaken stock is held
by the corporation .in trust for the cor'porators, and must be
disposed of for the benefit of all, that it cannot be disposed of
unuquaily to the corporators ; and -that if so disposed of, each
corporator injured may have his action against'the corporation.
Neither of these cases decides that a stockholder has any greater
rig4htz than a stranger to subscribe to original stock untaken ; and
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we are unable to see why the directors-of the Erie and Pittsburgh
Railroad Company could not permit M'Collum to subscribe for
all the untaken stock, why they could not issue certificates to
him when he had subscribed, and why, having thus become a
stockholder, he could not vote at an election.
The Act of 1865, then, was unnecessary; it was but a re-enactment of that which had been previously enacted.
The bill also assaili another Act of Assembly, passed on the
21st day of March 1865, by which the board of directors of the
company was authorized to issue preferred. stock.
It avers that the plaintiff never agreed to any such issue, that
the*act was procured without his assent, and that he did not know
of-its passage until months after it had been enacted.
It is also charged that it is the intention of the company to
issue such preferred stock ; but why this is illegal, or how, it is
injurious to the plaintiff, the bill does not show.
Doubtless the Act of Assembly did not 6ffect an alteration in
the charter until accepted, but the bill does not deny that it was
accepted by the stockholders. It admits it was, by the board of
directors. Clearly, if accepted by the stockholders, the directors
are authorized to issue a preferred stock, and their doing so is no
wrong to the complainant, though he may be opposed to their
action. It is not to be questioned that the legislature may confer
enlarged powbrs upon the managers of a corporation with the
assent of the shareholders, and that no one stockholder, by refusing his assent, can hinder the exercise of the enlarged towers.
From what has been said it will be seen that in our opinion the
plaintiff's bill exhibits no case calling upon a court of equity to
grant him relief.
The demurrer must therefore be sustained, and the bill
dismissed,.
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Supreme Court of -Pennsylvania.
FARNHAM, KIRKHAM & CO. v. THE CAMDEN AND AMBOY
RAILROAD COMPANY.
A carrier may by special contract limit his liability except as against his -wr
negligence.
Where a person delivers goods to a carrier and receives a bill of lading expressing that the goods are received for transportation subject to the conditions on the
back of the bill, by one of which the carrier's liability is limited to a certain rate
per lb., this constitutes a special contract by the parties, and the carrier, in the
absence of proof of negligence, is only liable at the rate agreed upon.
Goods were received by defendants, a railroad company, under a special contract
as set forth in the preceding paragraph, and were safely carried to their wharf at
New York, and placed on the wharf ready for delivery, but before the plaintiffs
had notice of their arrival or opportunity to remove them, a fire broke out on
board a steamer of the defendants lying at the wharf, which entirely consumed

the boat, and also the wharf and the goods thereon. There was no evidence as
to the origin of the fire. Held, that plaintiffs could not recover more than the
special rate agreed upon without proving negligence of the defendants.
- THIS was a case stated to determine the liability of the defendants under the following circumstances. The plaintiffs delivered
to defendants for transportation to New York certain bales of
goods, of the weight of 3220 poundsand the value of $6778.24.
A bill of lading for the goods was signed by an agent of defendants and delivered to plaintiffs, who accepted and transmitted it to
New York to their agent to receive the goods. The bill promised
to deliver the goods "subject to the conditions expressed on the
back of this receipt," the material parts of which were as follows:
"The responsibility of the company as carriers of the within
named goods is hereby limited so as not to exceed one hundred
dollars for every 100 lbs. weight thereof, and at that rate for a
greater or less quantity, the shipper declining to pay for any
higher risk. The company will insure to any amount if desired."
The'defendants were a corporation created by the state of New
Jersey, and by the law of that state were authorized to limit their
liability in the manner above stated, up6n giving notice in the
bill of lading and by a general notice posted in the company's
office for receiving freight. Due notice was given in these waye
in this case.
The goods were safely transported to New York, where they
arrived on the night of Saturday July 9th or on the morning of
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Sunday July 10th'1864, and were placed under a shed -n. the
wharf ready for delivery, and while there and before the plaintiffs had notice of their arrival or opportunity to remove them, a
fire broke out on board a steamboat called the John Potter,
belonging to the defendants and then lying at the aforesaid wharf,
which totally consumed the said steamboat, wharf and sheds and
all the goods thereon, including the plaintiffs' bales. The origin
of the fire was totally unknown; four watchmen employed by
defendants being on duty at the time on the wharf and boat and
the crew on the boat.
Defendants admitted their liability for $3220, being at the
rate of $1 per lb., and had paid that amount without prejudice;
but the plaintiffs claimed $6778.24, the value of the goods.
The judgment at Nisi Prius was for defendants, and the plaintiffs then had the case certified to the court in banc.
Henry H. Phillips,for the plaitiffs.--Tlie carrier's duty is to
transport goods, and- he is legally responsible for all losses from
whatever cause arising, except the acts of God and the public
enemy.
Regarding him as an insurer, the law allows him'to.demand a
premium proportioned to the hazard of his employment: Coggs v.
Bernard,2-Ld. Raym. 909; Same v. Colton, 1 Id. 546, 655, 1
Salk.,143; Riley v. Howe, 5 Bing. 217; Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 10 Wright 151, 4 -Am. Law Reg. N. S. 15.
Whilst there are a number of cases that concede that carriers
may, by express agreements, avoid their cmmon-law liability as
insurers, yet such a contract will not excuse the carrier from gross
carelessn6ss or negligence ; and the onus *of-showing that the
cause of the loss was within the terms of the exception, and also
that there was no negligence, lies on the carrier:. Angell on Carriers, §§ 267, 268, 275; Hollister v. Nolen, 19 Wend. 234; Cole
v. Goodwin, Id. 251; Sager v. Railroad Co., 81 Maine' 228;
Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Richardson 286; Davidson v. Graham,
2 Ohio 133; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill 623; 2 Kent 607, note c;
C. and A. Railroad Co. v. Baldaitf, 4 Harris 67; Penna.
Railroad Co. v. MCloskey, 11 Id. 526; Ill. Central Railroad
Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 37 Jooper v. Wells, 5 Am. Law Reg. N.
8. 16.
The duty of a carrier is not fulfilled by simple transportation
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from port to port. The goods must be landed and the consignee
notified of their arrival: Owners of the Mary Washington v.
Ayres, 5 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 692.
All that the bailor has to do, in the first instance, is to prove
the contract and the delivery of the goods, and this throws the
burden of proof that they were lost, and the manner they were
lost, on the bailee, of which we have a right to require very plain
proofs: Beekman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle 179; Clarke v. Spence,
10 Watts 337.
The case of Swindler v. Hfilliard, 2 Richardson 286, is remarkably like the present. There the verdict showed that cotton
in bales was burnt on board a boat running between Charleston
and Columbia, and there, as here, was proven a special contract
exempting the carrier from dangers of fire or navigation. How
the fire originated was unexplained, and from the evidence there
was in that 6ase at least as much care and watchfulness is in the
present, one. But all the judges concurred in the opinion that
the burdei of proof as to cause of the fire, rested on the carrier,
afid in the absence of this, the inference was against him. This
case is cited and approved in Angell on Carriers,,§ 267.
J. E. Gowen, A. I. Fish and St. George T. Campbell, for
the defendants.-l. A-carrier may limit his liability : Southeote'a
Case, 4 Coke 84 (that this is still authority, see Farmers',.&c.?
Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co., 23 Vt. 205) ; Paradinev. Jane,
Aleyn 26; Morse v. Slue, Ventris, pt. 1, 190, 238-; Kenrig v.
Eggleston, Aleyn 93; York Co. v. Central Railroad Co.,, 3
Wall. 107 ;-Peninsula,&c., Co. v. Shand, 11 Jur. 771 ; Dorrv.
N. J. Steam Nav. Co., 1 Kernan 484; Bingham v. Rogers, 6
W. & S. 495; Lang v. Calder, 8 Barr 479; Camden, &c.,Railroad Co. v. Baldauf, 4 Harris 67; Chouteaux-v. Leech, 6 Id.
224; Whitesell v. Crane, 8 W. & S. 373; IVan Toll v. S. E.
Railway Co., 12 Scott 75.
2. A special acceptance, as in this case, changes the rule of
liability of the carrier. Steamboat New World v. King, 16
Howard 475; Citizens' -Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 5 Wright -394.
Hfays v. Kennedy, Id. 378; Thorogood v. Marh,. Gow's
Rep. 105; Story on Bailments, § 551, 7th ed.; Peck v. N. "S.
Railway Co., 32 Law Journal Rep. 241. 3. A loss in a case like the present is not presumed to be the
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fault of the carrier, so as to cast on him the burden of proof. Ir
is true that in the case of a common carrier, who has made no
special contract with his customer, the fact of the non-delivery
of the goods intrusted to his charge is alone sufficient to render
him responsible, but there the question of negligence is not in
issue. He is held responsible because his undertaking was that
of an insurer, and, negligent or not, he must make good the loss.
He was paid for insuring the delivery of the goods, and cannot
complain of being held to his obligation. But a private carrier,
liable only for negligence,
or any other ordinary bailee for hire, is"
and is not to be presunred guilty until he prove his innocence.
Where he fails to deliver the articles committed to his custody,
he must, of course, give some reasonable account of the circumThat obligation is
stances on which he relies as an excuse.
necessarily implied even where the bailment was gratuitous, and
the silence of the -bailee under such circumstances would, from
the very necessity of the case, be conclnsive evidence of the
grossest negligence or even fraud. But where the non-delivery
is accounted for, and it does not appear that there was any negli
gence on the part of the bailee, the maxim quod non apparet,
non eat, will apply as in other cases: Beekman v. Shouse, 5
Rawle 189; Clark v. Spence, 10 Watts 335-; Goldey v. Penn.
Railroad Co., 6 Casey 242; NYew Jersey Steam NTavigation. Co.
v. Aferchants' Bank, 6 Howard 384; Marsh v. Home, 5 B.
& 0. 248; Angell on-Carriers, § 276; Story on Bailments, §
573; and Greenleaf on Evidence, § 218; Sager v. The Railroad
See also the. elaborate opinion" of
Company, 81 Maine R. 228.
PARKE, B., in Wild v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 460.
4. The defendants offered to receive the"goods without limitation as to responsibility, if paid a compensatory rate.. It is like
the case of receiving goods of a certain value at one rate, and
those of higher value at a higher rate. The plaintiffs having
chosen the lower rate should not have the higher indemnity.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THomPsoN, J.-It does not admit of a doubt, that a common
carrier may, by a special contract and perhaps by notice, limit
his liability for loss or injury to goods carried by him, as to every
cause of injury excepting that arising from his own or the negli.
gence of his servants. A great variety of cases cited in the very
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able argument of the learned counsel for the defendants, establishes
this as the rule in England, from Southcote's,Case, 4 Coke's Rep.
84, A. D..1001, down to The Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company v. The Hon. ParquarShand, 11 Jurist 771,
in 1865. The same rule generally holds in the several states in
this country, as will appear in Story on Bailments, § .549, notes
(a) and (b), .Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Navigation aompany,
1 Kern. 484, and in the Supreme Court o*f the United States.
York Co. v. The Central Railroad Co., 3 Wal. 107. This has
long been the rule in this state, as is shown by Bingham v.
Rogers, 6 W. & S. 495; Lang v. Calder, 8 Barr 479; The
Camden and Amboy Railroad .Co. v. Baldauf, 4 Harris 67;
.Chouteaux v. Leech, 6 Id. 224; Goldey V;. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 6 Casey 248; and Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Henderson, Leg. Int., vol. 28, p. 248, 1-866. That there was" a
special acceptance limiting the defendants' liability to $1 a pound
in case of loss or destruction in this case, is among the facts
found in the case stated. The bill of lading duly executed and
signed by the agent of the defendants containing the limitation,
it is agreed, was delivered t9 the plaintiffs, accepted by them,
and remitted to their agent at New York as his authority to
receiye the goods. These, thereforej were the terms on which
the transporters shipped their goods, and on which they were
received to be transported. As this was a limitation of the common-law liability, we are to presume, of course, that the chafge
for transportation was in proportion to 'the risk, an. element of
charge in all such eases. The condition of shipment on the bill
of lading shows this by expressing the limitation to be, becau'se
of the "shipper delining to pay for any higher risk." "We have,
therefore,'a contract to transport goods under a special agreement
as to liability, and a consideration based, we must presume, on
the undertaking in its limited form. - This limitation, we are warranted in saying, tQok the case but of the law of common carriers
carried it into one of the numerous classes of bailments, and
it henceforth became. liable to be governed by the law of the
class. The reason will be apparent on a moment's reflection!.
The common law defines the duty and the liability in the one
case-in the other the law is set aside by agreement of the parties, and they make a law for themselves, and thus they stand on
the relation they create and not on the law. of common carriers.
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By the common law the carrier is an insurer of the goods intrusted
to him, excepting so. far as they are damaged by the act of God
or public enemies. By a contract limiting liability, he is an
insurer by agreement and according to its terms. If there be a
loss, the agreement furnishes the extent of liability, and the bailor
is confined to that unless he can show that the loss occurred from
the wvilfulness or negligence of the carrier. His liability is as a
private carrier or bailee, as a consequence of the limitation. This
is settled in various forms of expression, in numerous books and
cases of authority. In Angell on the. Law of Carriers, § 268, it
is said: "Therefore, as.there has been occasion before to show,
that in cases of contract, and by means of notices, common carriers descend to the situation of only private carriers for hire."
In York County .v.The Central Railroad (Jo., sulpra, this language is found: "By the special agreement the carrier becomes,
with reference to the particular transaction, an ordinary bailee, a
private carrier for hire." In Goldey v. Th-e Pennsylvania Bailroad Co., 6 Casey 242, we said the same thing in these words:
"iThe ,most it (the limitation) can do, is to relieve them from
those conclusive presumptions of negligence which arise, when an
accident happens that is not inevitable even by the highest care,
and to require that negligence be actuallyproved against them."
In The _. J.Steam .Nav. Co. v. The Merchants' Bank, 6 -How.
884, the principle is thus stated: "The respondents having succeed~d in restricting their liability as carriers by the special'
agreement, the burden of proving that the loss was occasioned by
the want of due care, or by gross negligence, lies on the libellants, which would be 6therwise in the absence of any such
restriction." The same principle appears in Marsh v. Horne, 5
B. & C. 243, where the limitation as to the extent in value of
liability, was held to vary the relation and require proof of negli.
gence against the carriers. So in Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt.
264, this rule was applied. See also to this effect, Angell on
Carriers, § 276; Story on Bail., § 573; 2 Greenl. Ev., § 218;
and Sager v. The Railroad Co., 81 Maine-R. 228. Without
pursuing further this line of thought, we must proceed to determine how this case stands affected by these principles.
The plaintiffs shipped goods on the 8th of July 1864, by the
defendants' line, to New York, under an acceptance of limited
liability as well as notice.
VOL. XVI.-12
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The goods were safely carried by the defendants to their wharf
at New York, and placed under a shed on the wharf ready for
delivery, but before the plaintiffs had notice of their arrival or
opportunity to remove them, a fire broke out on board a steamer
of the defendants lying at the wharf, which entirely consumed the
boat with her cargo, and also the wharf and shed and the goods
therein, including the goods of the plaintiffs. The origin of the
fire remains unknown. Watchmen employed by the defendants
were on duty at the time, and the crew of the steamer were on
board. These facts all appear in the case stated. It also appears
that the defendants have paid to the plaintiffs the full amount of
liability stipulated for and assumed in case of loss in the bill of
lading. Are they bound to the extent of the entire loss ? If so,
the exception or limitation would amount to nothing; not, it is
true, because the limitation is void, but on a question regarding
the burden of proof. Assuming the contract, or special- acceptance of the goods to be carried by the defendants, to bring them
within the-doctrine applicable to bailments for compensation, the
rtile seems clearly to be, "that where a demand of the thing
loaned is nade, the parity must return it, or give some account
how it was lost. If he shows a loss, the circumstances of which
do not lead to any presumption of negligence on his part, then
the burden of proof might perhaps belong to the plaintiff to
establish it:" Story on Bail. § 278. "But if a suit should be
brought against the pawnees for a negligent loss of the pawvn,
then it would be incumbent upon the plaintiff to .support the
allegations of his declarations by proper proofs, and onus probandi in respect to negligence would be thrown on him :". Id.
§ 339, and note 4. " With certain exceptions, which" will here
after be taken notice of (as to innkeepers and common carriers),
it would seem that the burden of proof of negligence is on the
bailor ; and proof merely of the loss is not sufficient to put the
bailee on his defence :" Id. § 410. The text is supported by
many authorities. 'The common law, consistent with itself in
this, as in all other cases, lays the basis of this rule in the presumpti6n that every person is presumed to do his duty until- tle
contrary is proved. This is a great modification of the. Roman
law, which held the acts of faithlessness in a bailee as intamous,
and compelled him to acquit himself thereof by proof. The
French rule as to proof is the same. The rule in Englant
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and in many of the states, if not all, is what Story states it to be
supra. See Marsh v. Horne, 5 B. & 0.; and Harrisv. Packwood, 3 Taunt. supra; and Wild v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 460.
In Beekman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle 179, speaking of a case of
special acceptance to carry, and of suit against the bailee,
ROGERS, J., says: "Less than positive proof" (why the goods
never reached their destination) "1would suffice ; but some
account should be giien from which the jury would be warranted
to infer that the goods had either been discharged or had been
lost by accident, or had gone into other hands than the defendant's or his agents." -This case shows that where a bailee
acdounts for a loss, in a way not to implicate himself in a charge
of negligence, this is a sufficient defence, unless the plaintiff
prove negligence. This is the plaintiff's reply to the plea in
excuse of performance. It is an affirmative position, and must
be proved by the party alleging it.
It is true, the plaintiffs iuthe first instande, taking the present
ease in illustration, must have shown, if it had been tried in the
ordinary way, that they delivered the goods to the defendants to
be carried to New York, that their agent called for them and
could not get them; there they might rest to hear the reply, and
that would be proof that the goods were accidentally consumed
by a fire breaking out on the steamboat at the wharf, which consumed the boat, the wharf and buildings of the defendants, and
the goods in them, including the plaintiffs' ; that the boat had its
complement of men on board, and the defendants' four watchmen
on the wharf, but from these facts negligence could not be inferred. The plaintiffs' reply would be, "All that may be true;
but the fire originated in your negligence. " Is it not perfectly
clear that, as that was not inferable from the defendants' own
case, that the plaintiffs must prove it ? This is not to be doubted.
The same doctrine with that cited above is also to be found in
Clark v. Spence, 10 Watts 335, in Goldey v. Penna.Railroad Co.,
6 Casey, supra,and in N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Herchiants.'Bak,
6 How. 384. We think, therefore, that as the contract to carry
these goods was as bailees for hire, and not as common carriers,
and as they did carry them according to their agreement to the
terminus of their line, and they were there destroyed by fire, the
defendants are not liable, in the absence of proof of negligence,
to respond to the.plaintiffs' claim. The doctrine is firmly settled,

